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In Werner, the Fourth Circuit recognized that Rule 407 merely
codified the common law on subsequent repairs and was therefore a
proper subject for judicial interpretation.79 The court followed tradi-
tional common law reasoning to find that without the protection offered
by Rule 407, drug manufacturers would be reluctant to take remedial
measures after injuries. The Werner court narrowly construed the
feasibility exception and refused to broaden the exception to include
strict liability cases. The Fourth Circuit, however, failed to consider the
consumer protection policy that led to the adoption of strict liability and
incorrectly applied federal procedural law instead of state substantive
law. Unless Congress acts to change the provisions of Rule 407, the
Fourth Circuit is unlikely to allow admission of evidence of subsequent
repairs unless the defendant first controverts feasibility.
JEFFREY C. PALKOVITZ
X. LABOR LAW
A. Recognition of the "Purely Informational"Exception to Employer's
Discharge Rights and the Union's "Duty to Investigate"
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the
rights of employees to engage in concerted activities for their "mutual
aid or protection."' Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states that an employer
commits an unfair labor practice if it interferes with, restrains, or
coerces employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.' The National
Labor Relations Board (Board) and the reviewing federal courts are
responsible for determining which concerted activities' are protected by
Section 7 and thus free from employer interference under section 8(a)(1).
Strikes, including spontaneous work stoppages, are generally considered
Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958). In fact, the Erie doctrine has never been invoked to void a
federal procedure rule. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). Since Rule 407 does not
expressly apply to strict liability, see text accompanying note 5 supra, the issue is not
whether to void the Rule. The Fourth Circuit should not have extended the Rule to include
strict liability because of the conflict with Maryland substantive policy. See note 77 supra.
7 628 F.2d at 856.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
Literally, "concerted activity" describes uniform action by two or more individuals.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (5th ed. 1979). Under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), "concerted activity" refers both to employees' actions and the legal status of those
actions. See Note, Concerted Activity Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
1955 U. ILL. L.F. 129, 129-32. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 298-301
(1978) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN).
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protected activity.4 Some strikes, however, may be unprotected because
they have unlawful objectives,' a tortious or criminal nature,6 or con-
travene statutory labor7 or other8 policies.
Strikes which violate no-strike provisions9 of collective bargaining
agreements"0 are generally considered unprotected activity." The NLRA
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1962). In Washington
Aluminum Co., eight employees walked off the job because the employer's machine shop
was extremely cold. Id. at 12. The Supreme Court found that the employees had acted in
concert in protesting their employer's failure to provide adequate heat. Id. at 14-15. The
employer's discharge of the employees violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by interfering with
employee rights under § 7 to act in concert for mutual protection. Id. at 17; accord, Richard
Shubert Assocs., 222 N.L.R.B. 867, 872, 91 L.R.R.M. 1411, 1412 (1976) (walking off job to pro-
test employer's insistence upon employees remaining at outdoor work stations despite icy
conditions held protected activity).
5 See Koretz & Rabin, The Development and History of Protected Concerted Activ-
ity, 24 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 715, 716-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kortez & Rabin] (citing
cases for proposition that strike with unlawful objective is unprotected). Section 8(b) of the
NLRA provides that a significant range of economic pressure devices used by unions con-
stitute unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). The activities include jurisdictional
strikes, secondary boycotts, and strikes for recognition despite the Board's certification of
another union as bargaining representative. See Kortez & Rabin, supra, at 717. The ac-
tivities prohibited by § 8(b) are not protected by § 7. See Cox, The Right to Engage in Con-
certed Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 325 (1951).
One commentator has proposed that employees should never be discharged for engag-
ing in concerted activities to obtain mutual aid or benefit unless their conduct was unlawful
and the employees knew, or should have known, of the unlawful nature of that conduct.
Schatski, Some Observations Concerning aMisnomer- "Protected" Concerted Activities, 47
TEXAS L. REv. 378, 379 (1969).
a See Koretz & Rabin, supra note 5, at 717 (citing cases for proposition that strike of
tortious and criminal nature is unprotected); Cox, BOK & GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LABOR LAW 936 (8th ed. 1977) (same); e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U.S. 240, 252 (1939) (strikers' activity held unprotected where employees violated state-
court injunction, engaged in prolonged sitdown strike, forcibly seized plant, and destroyed
employer's property).
7 See Koretz & Rabin, supra note 5, at 717-18 (citing cases for proposition that strike
which contravenes basic NLRA policy is unprotected).
" See Koretz & Rabin, supra note 5, at 719-24 (citing cases for proposition that adop-
tion of improper means of achieving otherwise legitimate objective may render concerted
action unprotected); e.g., Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1950)
(discharge proper of workers who slowed down pace when employer changed payment
method from piece-work basis to straight hourly rate).
'No-strike provisions generally fall into two categories. They are either unconditional
bans on strikes, absolutely restraining the right to strike during the life of the contract, or
conditional bans, requiring the employees to refrain from striking only until a certain condi-
tion has been met or a procedure exhausted. LAB. REL. REP. EXPEDITOR 131 (1975).
,0 A collective bargaining agreement regulates terms and conditions of employment
between an employer and a labor union. See GORMAN, supra note 3, at 540-41. The agree-
ment constitutes a "generalized code to govern a myriad of cases." United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960).
1, NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939); United Elec., Radio & Mach.
Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981
(1956); Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445, 447, 19 L.R.R.M. 1187, 1188 (1947); see
Koretz & Rabin, supra note 5, at 717.
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encourages parties to delineate their respective rights in a collective
bargaining agreement.'2 To assure that production is not interrupted, the
employer bargains for a no-strike provision in the agreement.'3 The
union's quid pro quo for conceding a no-strike clause to the employer is the
establishment of an internal arbitration procedure'4 or the employer's
waiver of its right to lock out employees to enforce company demands. 5 If
a no-strike provision is not expressly included in the agreement, 6 the
courts may imply a no-strike clause if the labor agreement contains a
broad grievance-arbitration provision. 7 Since the negotiation of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is a basic goal of the NLRA," an activity which
violates a provision of a collective bargaining agreement contravenes the
policy of the NLRA and is generally unprotected.'9 A no-strike provision
therefore makes a subsequent strike unprotected activity,2° and the
employer may properly discharge strikers without committing an unfair
labor practice.
21
12 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The overriding policy of the NLRA includes the encourage-
ment of the "practice and procedure of collective bargaining." Id.
" A no-strike provision is the principal advantage which an employer can reasonably
expect from a collective bargaining agreement. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1947). Such agreements contribute to the normal flow of commerce and the maintenance of
regular production schedules. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956).
" See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); BNA, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 534-35 (C. Morris ed. 1971). Express arbitration provisions supply a
non-legal internal method of resolving contract disputes. Complaints are typically brought
to a low-level supervisor and, if still unresolved, are heard by higher-level supervisors or
ultimately an arbitrator. See GORMAN, supra note 3, at 541-43. Unions insist on the establish-
ment of an internal arbitration procedure, requiring the employer to submit all employee
grievances to arbitration, to protect the employees from the relative strength of the
employer. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-82
(1960).
" Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956). An employer "locks out" its
employees when, for tactical reasons, it refuses to utilize those employees for the perfor-
mance of available work. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 355.
, In 1975, express no-strike provisions appeared in approximately 900 of all collective
bargaining agreements. LAB. REL. REP. EXPEDITOR 131 (1975).
" Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962). The presence of
a broad arbitration provision gives rise to an implied union obligation not to strike over any
dispute subject to arbitration. Id. The union can retain the right to strike about an ar-
bitrable grievance only by explicit reservation. Id.; see GORMAN, supra note 3, at 613-14;
Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672, 690 (1967).
18 See note 12 supra.
1 See notes 9-11 supra.
NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939); see Packer's Hide Ass'n v. NLRB,
360 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1966); UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1958); NLRB v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 217 F.2d 366, 368-69 (9th Cir. 1954). Strikes in violation of
a no-strike provision are not unlawful; rather, they are considered lawful but unprotected.
W. & M. CONNOLLY, WORK STOPPAGES AND UNION RESPONSIBILITY 204 (1977).
" NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply- Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953); Food Fair Stores, Inc.
v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 1974). Courts have consistently upheld the right of a
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Although no-strike provisions are grounded firmly in the bargaining
process, courts have recognized that certain classes of strikes should be
protected even though they violate no-strike provisions. Courts have
determined that protected activities include strikes in protest of unfair
labor practices,22 dangerous working conditions,' and fundamental
breaches of an employer's obligation.24 Discharging employees for engag-
company to discharge strikers for violations of a no-strike provision. See cases cited in
Fairweather, Employer Actions and Options in Response to Strikes in Breach of Contract,
18 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 129, 173-76 (1966). No-strike clauses establish the employee's uninter-
rupted work as a condition of employment. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238,
246 (1962). If the employees breach that condition by striking, their employer may treat
them as having severed their relationship with the company and discharge them. Id.; NLRB
v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939).
1 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283-84 (1956). A strike which flows
from an employer's unfair labor practice is protected unless the employees specifically
waive their right to an unfair labor practice strike in the no-strike clause. Id. at 271-72. In
Mastro, the employer had engaged in a series of unfair labor practices to dominate the
employee's selection of a bargaining agent. Id. at 278. Since union selection is central to the
right of free organization and collective bargaining, the court found that the strike should
be protected. Id. at 280-83; see 7 VILL. L. REV. 489, 491-93 (1962). However, strikes are pro-
tected only where the unfair labor practice committed by the employer is serious. Arlan's
Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802, 804, 48 L.R.R.M. 1731, 1735 (1961). In Arlan's, a strike in
response to an employer's unfair labor practice was found to be unprotected where the un-
fair labor practice was isolated and the product of a clash of personalities. Id. at 808, 48
L.R.R.M. at 1735. The Board recognized that adequate redress was available under the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract. Id. The Board has seldom applied the
restriction set forth in Arlan's. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 306.
" See Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1964). Section 7 protects
strikes over safety issues when the collective bargaining agreement does not contain a no-
strike provision. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962); Union
Boiler Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 818, 822, 87 L.R.R.M. 1268, 1268-69 (1974), enforced, 90 L.R.R.M.
3057 (4th Cir. 1975). When a no-strike provision binds the employees, § 502 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) operates to protect strikes over safety hazards. 29
U.S.C. § 143 (1976); see Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492, 495 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833 (1964); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 759 (6th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958). Section 502 provides that employees' activity is
protected when they stop working in good faith because of abnormally dangerous working
conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
Courts consider work stoppages over abnormally dangerous conditions to be beyond
the scope of common no-strike provisions. See Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety:
Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REv. 647, 659 (1975). For the work stop-
page to be protected, the working conditions must be shown to be abnormally dangerous
based on objective evidence, rather than the mere subjective fear of the employees.
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974); see Ashford & Katz, Unsafe Work-
ing Conditions: Employee Rights Under the Labor Management Relations Act and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 802, 805-07 (1977); Note, The Right
to Strike Over Safety Issues, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 200, 204-07 (1974) (factors to consider in
determining whether working conditions are abnormally dangerous).
2, San Juan Lumber Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1155, 60 L.R.R.M. 1102, 1103 (1965), en-
forced on other grounds, 367 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1966). In San Juan Lumber, employees were
unable to cash employment checks due to their employer's insufficient funds during the
previous year. Id. at 1161, 60 L.R.R.M. at 1102. The employees went on strike. Id. The
1981]
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ing in protected activity is an unfair labor practice."
In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, the
Fourth Circuit recognized a new exception to the employer's right to
discharge striking employees under a no-strike provision.' The court
considered whether the work stoppage in Newport News was "purely in-
formational" in character and not a violation of the no-strike agreement
and therefore protected activity.28 In addition, the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered whether the union violated the duty of fair representation by
agreeing arbitrarily to the employer's discharge of the strike's "ring-
leader" and by making threats of unequal representation to non-union
employees.29
In Newport News, the dispute began when the company assigned
construction employees to exposed working areas in severe winter
weather. 31 Within an hour of reporting to work, all the employees con-
gregated around a heating stove located in the work area and discussed
the possibility of being sent home because of the weather. 1 Hubert
South, acting as spokesman for the employees, asked the foreman
whether they would be sent home.2 2 The other employees remained gath-
ered around the heating stove and did not work.' The foreman informed
the employees that they would not be sent home and ordered them to
return to work. 4 The employees complied. 5
The company's Supervisor of Employee Relations determined that
the employees' failure to work while congregated around the heating
stove constituted a twenty-minute work stoppage in violation of the no-
strike provision of the collective bargaining agreement.2 He planned to
Board found that the employer's failure to issue paychecks covered by sufficient funds was a
material breach of the contract, thus excusing the employee strike in violation of the no-
strike provision. Id. at 1155, 60 L.R.R.M. at 1103; see note 81 infra. The fact that wages or
bonuses are paid within a very short time after their contracted due dates does not excuse
the employer's breach. See Androit Mfg. Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1362, 98 L.R.R.M. 1578,
1579 (1978).
" NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 52 (1972); see BNA, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 13 (C. Morris ed. Supp. 1971-75).
631 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 268-69.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 62-65 infra.
631 F.2d at 269-70; see text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
631 F.2d at 265.
SI Id. at 265-66. Article XI of the collective bargaining agreement provided that the
employer send the employees home when weather conditions prohibited working in the
open area. Id. at 265. The head of the lead trade was given the authority for making the
determination. Id. If the weather conditions prohibited working, the employees would





1 Id. Article V of the collective bargaining agreement prohibited "any strike (in-
cluding sympathy strike), picketing, slowdown or intentional interference with operation."
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discharge all of the employees involved.' The supervisor and the union
delegate reached a compromise, however. 8 Only South, the non-union
"ringleader," was discharged. 9 The other employees received a written
warning on their records and were docked for three-tenths of an hour of
pay." The union delegate agreed to the employer's discharge of South
before hearing South's explanation. 1 The delegate based his decision
almost entirely upon the employer's description of the incident."2 After
the employer decided to discharge South, the delegate failed to request
a two-day "cooling-off period" before the discharge would become final. 3
In addition, the union failed to appeal South's grievance with the com-
pany and refused to respond to his inquiries about the matter."
Following the incident, the union attempted to solicit union member-
ship among non-union employees. 5 In the course of their solicitation,
union agents told non-union employees that the employees would not
receive representation equal to that provided union employees unless
they joined the union."' The union agents implied that South would have
received better representation if he had belonged to the union.'
7
South filed unfair labor practice charges against the company and
the union, 8 alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1)"9 and 8(b)(1)(A) 0 of the
NLRA. The Board concluded that the company violated section 8(a)(1) by
The agreement stated that any employee engaging in such prohibited activity was subject





1 Id. The delegate did not hear South's explanation of the incident until just prior to
informing him of his discharge. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B.
1470, 1471, 98 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1466 (1978).
4 631 F.2d at 266. The union delegate did interview two of the employees involved. Id.
13 Id. The bargaining agreement provided the union the opportunity to request a two-
day "cooling-off period" before a discharge would become final. The agreement stated that a
request for the "cooling-off period" would be granted without exception. 236 N.L.R.B. at
1478.
" 631 F.2d at 266. If the union had appealed South's grievance, the dispute probably
would have been settled through the company's internal arbitration procedure rather than
through the Board proceeding. See note 14 supra.
1 631 F.2d at 266.
"5 Id. The union agents told one employee that they would "stand up and go to bat" for
him if he was a union member. Id. The agents told another non-union employee that they
would not represent him "as much" as they could a union member. Id.
47 Id.
236 N.L.R.B. at 1474.
42 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976); see text accompanying note 1 supra.
&0 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). A labor organization commits an unfair labor practice
if it restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7. Id. Section
8(b}(1)(A) was enacted to parallel the sanctions imposed on the employer by § 8(a)(1). See
Note, Fair Representation and Union Discipline, 79 YALE L.J. 730, 732 (1970).
19811
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discharging South and reprimanding the other employees." While the
Board found that the employees had engaged in a work stoppage,52 the
Board reasoned that the stoppage was for a "purely informational" pur-
pose and was not an attempt to pressure the company into sending the
employees home.' The Board held that the work stoppage constituted
protected activity, and therefore, the company's disciplinary measures
against South and other employees were unlawful.'
The Board also concluded that the union interfered, restrained, and
coerced South in his exercise of section 7 rights and thereby violated
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA." The Board reasoned that the union
represented South arbitrarily by agreeing to his discharge without con-
sulting him or investigating the incident and by refusing to appeal his
grievance. 6 In addition, the Board determined that union agents'
statements threatening to deny non-union members equal representa-
tion violated Section 8(b)(1)(A).'
7
The Board ordered the employer to reinstate South, reimburse him
for any lost earnings, and expunge the written warnings issued to the
other employees. 8 The Board permitted the employer to dock the em-
ployees' pay for the time they were not working." In addition, the Board
held the union jointly and severally liable with the employer for South's
loss of pay, because the union's failure to represent South properly was
a contributing factor to his unlawful discharge." The Board also directed
the union to represent non-union members fairly and cease its threats to
represent them unfairly."1
On review, the Fourth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's
determination that the company violated section 8(a)(1)."' The court did
" 236 N.L.R.B. at 1471, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
12 Id. The work stoppage lasted for a period of about twenty minutes. Id. The ad-
ministrative law judge previously held that, due to the extenuating circumstances, the
employees' activity could not be classified as a work stoppage. Id. at 1477.
" Id. at 1471, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1466. The Board indicated that no-strike provisions apply
only to employee conduct which attempts to bring pressure on the employer. Id.; see
District 1199-E, Nat'l Union of Hosp. and Health Care Employees, 229 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1011,
95 L.R.R.M. 1214, 1215 (1977) (employees' conduct was not intended to bring pressure on the
employer and therefore cannot be regarded as a strike).
236 N.L.R.B. at 1471, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
"Id.
Id. In view of the union's contemporaneous threat of less favorable treatment to
other non-union members, Board Member Truesdale found that the union's handling of
South's discharge was not merely perfunctory, inept, or careless, but was arbitrary action
so grounded in bad faith as to constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.
Id. at 1471 n.9, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1467.
" Id. at 1472, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
5Id.
" Id. at 1471 n.7, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
Id.; see King Soopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1011, 1020, 91 L.R.R.M. 1292, 1294 (1976).
236 N.L.R.B. at 1473.
631 F.2d at 268. The Board's order is not self-executing. If the Board wishes to en-
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not apply the "purely informational" exception because no information
was actually disseminated during the time the employees were not
working. 3 Instead, the employees were waiting for a management deci-
sion." Since the court did not apply the exception, the employees' con-
duct was not protected, and therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the
employer's disciplinary measures did not constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice."
The Fourth Circuit also considered South's charge that the union
violated its duty of fair representation.6 The duty of fair representation
imposes an obligation upon the union to represent fairly all the
employees in the bargaining unit,67 regardless of whether they are
members of the union.6 The union breaches the duty of fair representa-
force an order against a party, it must convert its order to a court order by petitioning a
federal court of appeals under § 10(e) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976); see GORMAN,
supra note 3, at 10-11.
' 631 F.2d at 269. The dissent argued that courts must give considerable deference to
the Board's application of the NLRA. Id. at 270 (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236-37 (1963). Since the Board's find-
ing of a "purely informational" work stoppage was supported by substantial evidence, the
dissent reasoned that the court should enforce the Board's order. 631 F.2d at 270 (Hall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
631 F.2d at 269.
Id. The Fourth Circuit also held that it was proper for the company to discharge
South, the leader of the unauthorized work stoppage, while merely disciplining the other
employees. Id.; see Poloron Products, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 435, 437, 71 L.R.R.M. 1577, 1579
(1969); Unkovic, Enforcing the No-Strike Clause, 21 LAB. L.J. 387, 395 (1970). The company
could not lawfully differentiate in its discipline, however, if the basis for the differentiation
was protected activity. See, e.g., Precision Castings Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 183-84, 96
L.R.R.M. 1540, 1542 (1977) (an employer who singles out for discharge strikers holding union
office violates § 8(a)(3)).
631 F.2d at 269-70.
Letter Carriers, Branch 6000 v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The duty
of fair representation was first recognized in a case arising under the Railway Labor Act.
Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944). The Supreme Court later recognized
that the NLRA also imposed a duty of fair representation. Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23,
350 U.S. 892 (1955), rev'g 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
Under § 9(a) of the NLRA, a union chosen by a majority of employees in a bargaining
unit has the right to act as the exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees in that unit.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). The "bargaining unit" includes those employees whose jobs have a
sufficient commonality of needs and interests to form an election constituency for the pur-
pose of deciding whether to elect a majority union representative. See GORMAN, supra note
3, at 66. Bargaining unit employees do not have to be union members. Id. Individual
employees have no separate negotiating rights an4 must look exclusively to that union for
protection of their interests. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); Letter Carriers, Branch 6000 v.
NLRB, 595 F.2d at 811.
" Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 1971) (union
wrongfully induced company to discharge employee and failed to process his grievance
because he was not member of union); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
316 F.2d 191, 199 (4th Cir. 1963) (disparate treatment based on union membership cannot be
tolerated); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1945) (union wrongfully re-
fused to handle grievance for bargaining-unit member of minority union); United
1981]
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tion when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is ar-
bitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." The courts apply the
preceeding three standards independently and will find that a union
breached its duty of fair representation if the union has violated any one
standard." A breach of the duty of fair representation constitutes an un-
fair labor practice prohibited by section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.71
In Newport News, the Fourth Circuit held that the Board's deter-
mination of a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation was supported by substantial
evidence. 2 The court reasoned that the union failed to fulfill the duty of
fair representation by agreeing to South's discharge without consulting
him or substantially investigating the incident.73 The court found,
however, that the union was not required to reimburse South for back-
Steelworkers, Local 937 (Magma Copper Co.), 200 N.L.R.B. 40, 43, 81 L.R.R.M. 1445, 1445
(1972) (union wrongfully refused to process grievances for employees who were not union
members). See also Jacobs, The Duty of Fair Representation: Minorities, Dissidents and
Exclusive Representation, 59 BOSTON U.L. REV. 857, 864 (1979).
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
7o 386 U.S. at 190. After the Supreme Court's decision in Vaca, circuits have been
divided on whether bad faith conduct on the part of the union is required in every case, or
whether discriminatory or arbitrary conduct alone would suffice to constitute a breach of
duty. Compare Jackson v. TWA, Inc., 457 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1972) ("factual malice" re-
quired) and Local 13, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061,1067 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (choice motivated by good faith may fall within conduct allowed
union) with Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 1975) (arbitrary or
discriminatory union action need not be motivated by bad faith to amount to unfair
representation) and Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) (without any hostile
motive of discrimination and in good faith, union action may nonetheless be so arbitrary as
to violate duty). See generally Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Struc-
ture, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1119, 1124 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
In contrast to the subjective notion of bad faith, the use of the term "arbitrary" in
Vaca suggests an objective standard against which a union's conduct is to be measured. See
Comment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation; Consolidating
Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L. REV. 886, 888 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Post-Vaca
Standards]. In Griffin v. UA W, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the repeated references to
"arbitrary" in Vaca represented a calculated broadening of the standard of the duty of fair
representation. 469 F.2d at 183; see Post-Vaca Standards, supra, at 896. In Griffin, the
Fourth Circuit imposed an affirmative obligation on the union to provide an explanation for
its actions. 469 F.2d at 183; GORMAN, supra note 3, at 714.
" 386 U.S. at 177-78; Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584,
1587 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). In Miranda, the Board found
that the union's duty as the employee's exclusive representative under § 9(a) gave rise to a
corresponding right to the employees under § 7 to be represented fairly when they are
bargaining collectively through their exclusive representative. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185; 51
L.R.R.M. at 1587. Thus, if a union arbitrarily fails to represent the bargaining unit
members, it violates their § 7 rights and § 8(b)(1)(A). Id.; see Comment, Refusal to Process a
Grievance, The NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Representation A Plea for Pre-Emption, 26 U.
PITT. L. REV. 593, 604 (1965); Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Con-
temporary Framewo'k and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee,8 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1096, 1103-05 (1974).
631 F.2d at 269.
70Id.
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pay." Since the employer had proper justification for discharging South,
the court stated that South would not have received backpay even if the
union had represented him in a more competent fashion. 5 The Fourth
Circuit also enforced the Board's order that the union cease and desist
from making threats of unequal representation to non-union members. 78
Although courts other than the Fourth Circuit have not recognized
the "purely informational" exception," several courts and the Board
have recognized other exceptions to the employer's right to discharge
striking employees under a no-strike provision. 8 These recognized ex-
ceptions are based on the well-established contractual principle that one
party's breach of a material provision of a labor contract justifies non-
performance by the other party. 9 Employer practices which constitute a
material breach of a collective bargaining agreement include engaging in
74 Id.
75 Id. at 269-70; see Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976). If
the employer had wrongfully discharged South, damages against the union for loss of
employment would be recoverable only to the extent that the union's refusal to handle
grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer. Czosek v.
O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 (1970); see Note, The Duty of Fair Representation, 20 CATH. U.L.
REV. 271, 303 (1970).
"' 631 F.2d at 270. Courts have established that a union violates § 8(b)(1)(A) of the
NLRA by threatening to deny equal representation to employees who do not join the union.
See, e.g., Trico Workers Union, 246 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 102 L.R.R.M. 1621, 1622 (1979) (viola-
tion where union steward told employee that steward could not represent employees whose
names were on a list of those who had not paid union dues); Newport News Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1443, 1451-52, 97 L.R.R.M. 1304 (1977) (violation where article in
newsletter by union representative stated that he "was not going to waste much time"
representing non-union members).
n The Fourth Circuit is the first circuit court of appeals to recognize the "purely infor-
mational" exception. The Board created the exception in Empire Steel Mfg. Co., 234
N.L.R.B. 530, 97 L.R.R.M. 1304 (1978). In Empire Steel, an employee representative called a
meeting during the lunch period to discuss a recent employee injury and his meeting with
management regarding the injury. Id. at 531, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1305. Because the meeting ex-
tended ten minutes past the end of the lunch hour, the employee representative was later
discharged. Id. The Board held that the discharge was improper. Id. at 533, 97 L.R.R.M. at
1305. The Board reasoned that it would be "over-reaching" to treat the interruption as a
violation of the no-strike provision, in light of the "purely informational," non-pressuring
character of the meeting and the fact that § 7 rights "are not be be causally dealt away." Id.
at 532-33.
T See notes 22-24 supra.
San Juan Lumber Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1165, 60 L.R.R.M. 1102, 1103 (1965), en-
forced on other grounds, 367 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1966); see cases cited in United Elec., Radio
and Mach. Workers Local 1113 v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 981 (1956). The general contractual principle that one party need not perform if the
other party materially refused to do so, applies to labor contracts. 223 F.2d at 341; see
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274 (1932). Courts originally found that an employee strike in
violation of a no-strike provision was a material breach justifying the employer's subse-
quent recission of the contract. See 223 F.2d at 341; United Biscuit Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d
771, 775 (7th Cir. 1942). Courts later applied this reasoning to unlawful acts of the employer,
finding that such acts justified the employee's breach of a no-strike provision. See note 80
infra.
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unfair labor practices, failing to perform obligations under the contract,
and maintaining hazardous conditions." When an employer materially
breaches the labor contract, the employees are excused from their
obligations under a no-strike provision.8 Because an employer engaged
in a form of unlawful conduct which provoked a strike, the courts will
deny the employer the contract benefits to which he would otherwise be
entitled.82
The "purely informational" exception is clearly inconsistent with the
reasoning behind the other exceptions to the employer's right to
discharge strikers for violating a no-strike provision.83 The "purely infor-
mational" exception does not depend upon the employer's unlawful ac-
tion to justify the employees' breach of the no-strike provision.' Instead,
the exception gives employees an independent right to stop work briefly
to listen, so long as the employees' action does not put pressure on the
employer.8
The Fourth Circuit in Newport News indicated that only in specific
circumstances can a court apply the "purely informational" exception to
justify an employee's breach of the no-strike clause. The employees are
only permitted to stop work while information is being disseminated.8 In
San Juan Lumber Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1165, 60 L.R.R.M. 1102, 1103 (1965), en-
forced on other grounds, 367 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1966). Originally, the Board and the courts
did not base the protection of strikes in response to abnormally dangerous conditions and
unfair labor practices on the employer's unlawful action. Instead, courts protected strikes
over abnormally dangerous conditions because of the safety protection provided in § 502 of
the LMRA. See note 23 supra. Courts protected strikes over unfair labor practices to pro-
tect employee rights under § 7 of the NLRA. See note 22 supra. The Board, however,
recognized the common contractual principles underlying all the exceptions in formulating
the exception to the employer's right to discharge employees under a no-strike provision in
San Juan Lumber. 154 N.L.R.B. at 1164-65. The Board noted that the employees' strike may
be justified by an employer's breach of its contractual obligation to pay the employees, just
as a strike is justified when an employer has committed an unfair labor practice or maintain-
ed abnormally dangerous conditions. Id.
154 N.L.R.B. at 1165, 60 L.R.R.M. at 1103.
82 Id.
In Empire Steel, the employer argued that the employee meeting was not covered
by § 7 because it was "purely informational." 234 N.L.R.B. at 532. The Board appears to
have created the "purely informational" exception specifically to refute that argument. See
id. at 532 n.5.
" The work stoppages in Empire Steel and Newport News were in response to an
employee injury and cold weather respectively. 631 F.2d at 265-66; 234 N.L.R.B. at 531. The
lack of employee intent to have the action regarded as a "strike" supports the argument
that the work stoppages were not in response to an employer's unlawful activity.
631 F.2d at 269.
Id.; 234 N.L.R.B. at 532, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1305. "Information" has been defined as
,matters of employee concern in the context of the workplace." 234 N.L.R.B. at 532. The
Board has indicated that the "purely informational" exception applies to the dissemination
of information by an employee representative or the union. See National Vendors, Inc., 244
N.L.R.B. No. 167, 102 L.R.R.M. 1277, 1277 (1979) (union); 234 N.L.R.B. at 532 (employee
representative). The Fourth Circuit implied in Newport News that the exception can apply
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addition, the purpose of the employees' work stoppage cannot be to bring
pressure upon the employer. 7 Courts applying the "purely informa-
tional" exception must be convinced that the employees' section 7 rights
should not be sacrificed because of a brief noncoercive work stoppage.M
The "purely informational" exception thus prevents an employer from
abusing the no-strike provision and firing employees who engage in very
brief work stoppages without the intention to strike.89
Although the "purely informational" exception applies in limited cir-
cumstances, the criteria that justify the court's application of the excep-
tion are not conducive to consistent application. Since the courts will be
required to engage in subjective determinations of whether the strike
was noncoercive and based solely on informational inquiries, the excep-
tion will be subject to abuse. 0 Applied broadly, the "purely informa-
tional" exception threatens to destroy the practical importance of
negotiation in the collective bargaining process.9' The employer has sur-
rendered his right to lockout92 or has established an internal arbitration
procedure" to gain the assurance that his business will be free from the
production problems and chaos associated with strike activity.94 The
union has the opportunity during contract negotiations to ensure that
employees' section 7 rights are protected.9" By permitting the employees
to information disseminated by the employer, so long as the information is actually being
communicated at the time of the work stoppage. 631 F.2d at 269.
7 631 F.2d at 269; 234 N.L.R.B. at 532, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1305; see note 52 supra.
234 N.L.R.B. at 532; see N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)
(§ 7 should not be interpreted and applied in "restricted fashion"); Trustees of Boston Univ.,
224 N.L.R.B. 1385, 1388, 93 L.R.R.M. 1450 (1976) (§ 7 rights permit some leeway for com-
plusive behavior).
" See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 207, 207-08, 99 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1978) (fif-
teen minute deference of work assignment did not amount to work stoppage of type con-
templated by no-strike provision, due to brief duration and lack of interference with produc-
tion).
. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Newport News indicates the subjective nature of
determining whether the employees intended to pressure the employer through their work
stoppage. See 631 F.2d at 266 n.4 (some evidence in Newport News that employees intended
to pressure employer into sending them home); Brief for Petitioner at 21 (same).
In addition, the subjective nature of the "purely informational" exception poses con-
siderable risks to the employee who strikes in violation of a no-strike provision. As with the
other exceptions, the employee who strikes must wait until the Board determines whether
the strike fits the "purely informational" exception before he knows whether the strike is
protected or not. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir.
1964). Due to the lack of significant judicial recognition of the "purely informational" excep-
tion, an activity which an employee believes to be "purely informational" may later be found
to be unprotected.
See text accompanying notes 92-96 infra.
'2 See note 15 supra.
'" See note 14 supra.
" See note 13 supra. In Newport News, the employer surrendered his right to lockout
and agreed that employee grievances would be submitted to the grievance-arbitration pro-
cedure in the collective bargaining agreement. 631 F.2d at 267 n.7.
" See text accompanying notes 10 and 12 supra.
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to stop working without sanction despite the explicit terms of the
negotiated collective bargaining agreement, the court's reliance on the
"purely informational" exception weakens the employers' incentive to
agree to a no-strike provision and thereby increases the potential for
labor unrest. 6
The Fourth Circuit's application of the duty of fair representation to
the union's arbitrary conduct in agreeing to South's discharge without
investigating the incident is an unprecedented expansion of the duty.'
Prior to Newport News, the Fourth Circuit applied the duty of fair
representation to the union's obligation to process meritorious
grievances. 8 The court could have found that the union violated the duty
when it failed to appeal South's grievance.9 The court, however,
specifically based the breach of the duty of fair representation on the
union's failure to investigate the incident leading to South's discharge."'
The Fourth Circuit apparently recognized that the duty of fair represen-
tation applies to all union decisions which affect the rights of the
employees it represents, not solely to the union's remedial obligation to
process meritorious grievances. 1 1 Since the individual employees have
surrendered their individual negotiating rights to the union to act as
their agent in all aspects of employer relations, the union's responsibility
to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit should not be
limited to grievance proceedings."'
The duty of fair representation assures that individual rights will
not be forfeited when the union and the employer reach a disposition
regarding a given matter."3 Unions are not foreclosed from reaching an
The Supreme Court has recognized the imperative need to enforce no-strike clauses.
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976), the Court stated that
the employer would be deprived of his bargain and of the benefits of the national labor
policy encouraging private resolution of disputes if the federal courts could not issue injunc-
tions to enforce implied no-strike clauses.
' See text accompanying notes 98-102 infra. The Fourth Circuit determined that the
union breached the duty of fair representation because of its arbitrary conduct, not because
of any unequal treatment accorded South based on his non-union status. See note 68 supra.
The Board in Newport News had refused to adopt the administrative law judge's conclusion
that the union failed to process South's grievance because he was not a union member. 236
N.L.R.B. at 1471 n.8, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
" Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972).
See text accompanying notes 44 and 56 supra.
10 631 F.2d at 269.
101 Id.
"7 By electing the union as their majority representative, the individual employees ef-
fectively waived their individual negotiating rights. See note 67 supra. In return, courts
impose upon the union a duty to refrain from acting in an arbitrary manner toward the
employees. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). The Vaca Court did not limit the union's
duty to represent the employees fairly to grievance proceedings. Id. But sde GORMAN, supra
note 3, at 706 (duty only applies to union's bargaining and grievance-processing activities,
since duty is derived from the union's power as exclusive representative in those areas).
103 See note 106 infra.
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agreement with the employer."4 A union may be confronted with cir-
cumstances that require a choice between the interests of a single
employee and the interests of the other employees, or those of the union,
as a whole.0 5 If a union chooses to align itself with management in mak-
ing a decision contrary to the interests of a member of the bargaining
unit, however, the union's decision must not be arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith."' Only by acting consistently with the duty
of fair representation does the union strike an equitable balance be-
tween employee rights and the union's collective strength."7 As the
Fourth Circuit correctly recognized in Newport News, the union's
failure to investigate an incident prior to agreeing to the discharge of an
employee constituted arbitrary conduct.0 8 Thus, the Fourth Circuit im-
posed an affirmative "duty to investigate" on the union.
11 Unions need discretionary powers to negotiate effectively with powerful employers
on behalf of its members. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S 171, 191 (1967) (union accorded
considerable discretion in handling and settling grievances). See generally Clark, supra note
70, at 1120. The union may reach an agreement with the employer that does not provide
perfect equality of benefits for all employees. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330,
338 (1953); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658, 666 (6th Cir. 1961). In Ford Motor Co.,
the union accepted a provision in the collective bargaining agreement which gave
employees credit for pre-employment military service. 345 U.S. at 334. The Supreme Court
held that the union did not violate the duty of fair representation even though the provision
worked to the disadvantage of the other employees. Id. at 338. In Union News, the
employer proposed to discharge all of its employees to rid itself of a problem with shortages
in cash receipts. 295 F.2d at 660. The union investigated the matter and prevailed upon the
employer to lay off only half of the employees, the layoffs to become final if the cash shor-
tages ended. Id. at 661. The layoffs became final. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the union
had acted in the collective interest of those whom it represented by agreeing to the
discharge of half the employees. Id. at 666. But see note 106 infra.
I See Curth v. Faraday, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (local union did
not act arbitrarily in deciding not to arbitrate based on futility of case and union's
precarious financial condition). See also Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement as
Limitation on Union Control of Employee Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1036, 1054 (1970).
10 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). The Vaca recognition of the arbitrary stan-
dard places tighter restrictions on union-employer agreements. See note 70 supra. Several
commentators have noted that the union conduct in Union News, 295 F.2d at 660-61; see
note 104 supra, would have been found arbitrary after Vaca. See GORMAN, supra note 3, at
713; Comment, Protection of Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining: The Need for a
More Definitive Standard of Fair Representation Within the Vaca Doctrine, 14 VILL. L.
REv. 484, 492-93 (1969). See also Local 13, ILWU v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061,
1068 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that union may not expressly or tacitly agree with employer to
exchange individual employee's grievance for some other benefit).
I See notes 68-71 supra.
1 631 F.2d at 269. Courts have previously recognized the importance of investigation
on the part of the union in determining whether to process an employee's grievance. See
Miller v. Gateway Transp. Co., 616 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1980); Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring
Co., 558 F.2d 769, 770-71 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977); De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Pack-
inghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970). In Lowe, the Fifth
Circuit held that the union breached the duty of fair representation when it failed to in-
vestigate, upon request, an employee's discharge for assaulting a supervisor. 558 F.2d at
771 n.2. The Court rejected the union's defense that an investigation was not necessary
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While the Fourth Circuit explored new concepts in the two issues
posed by Newport News, the value of the court's discussions as future
authority are vastly different. The court's recognition and classification
of the "purely informational" exception to the employer's right to
discharge employees under a no-strike provision is inconsistent with the
reasoning of prior exceptions.0 9 While the exception was held not ap-
plicable to the facts of Newport News, the Fourth Circuit's decision
opens the door for possible abuses from which a no-strike provision was
originally intended to protect the employer."' On the other hand, the
court's recognition of the union's duty to investigate an incident before
agreeing to the discharge of an employee is consistent with previous
decisions"' and adds new substance to the union's duty of fair represen-
tation.
DANA S. CONNELL
B. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: The Employer's Narrow Duties to
Bargain Regarding Strikebreaker Bonuses and to Provide Information
Regarding Non-Bargaining Unit Employees
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the
right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid
or protection.' Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides that an employer
commits an unfair labor practice when it interferes with the employee
rights guaranteed in section 7.' An employer that violates the general
prohibition of section 7, and thus section 8(a)(1), may also commit one of
the more specific unfair labor practices outlined in sections 8(a)(2)
through 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.3 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides that
since such employee action is universally recognized as "just cause" for discharge. Id. at
773. In De Arroyo, the First Circuit held that the union acted arbitrarily because it never
investigated or made any judgment concerning the merits of plaintiffs grievance. 425 F.2d
at 284. See also GORMAN, supra note 3, at 718 (union must make full investigation, give grie-
vant opportunity to participate, and must develop colorable arguments).
' See text accompanying notes 77-85 supra.
1,0 See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 108 supra.
I 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)-(5) (1976); see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 132 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as GORMAN]. Section 8(a)(1) is a blanket provision. When any of the specific
unfair labor practices enumerated in §§ 8(a)(2)-(5) are committed, § 8(a)(1) is also violated. A
violation of § 8(a)(1), however, does not necessarily entail a violation of §§ 8(a)(2)-(5). Oberer,
The Scienter Factor in Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act. Of Balancing, Hostile
Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491, 493-94 (1967).
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an employer commits an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain col-
lectively with the employees' representative.4 An employer that fails to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with the employees'
representative regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment violates the duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5).
5
A strike is generally considered concerted activity under section 7,
since strikes are the major means that unions have to enforce em-
ployees' collective bargaining rights.' An employer that offers induce-
ments to non-striking employees may violate section 8(a)(1) if his action
so favors the non-striking employees as to destroy the employees' right
to strike guaranteed by section 7.7 The employer's conduct may not
violate section 8(a)(1), however, if the business justification for his action
is found to outweigh the interference with employees' section 7 rights
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Specific unfair labor practice sections also prohibit
employer domination of labor unions, employer discrimination against union membership,
and employer discrimination against employees who file charges or give testimony under
the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)-(4) (1976).
5 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976); see GORMAN, supra note 3, at 399-401.
8 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1962); see Koretz & Rabin,
The Development and History of Protected Concerted Activity, 24 SYRACUSE L. REv. 715,
715-16 (1973). Strikes have been accorded special deference in the enactment of federal labor
laws. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-35 (1963); accord, NLRB v. Rubatex
Corp., 601 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979).
' See text accompanying notes 59-60 infra. The Board may find a violation of § 8(a)(1)
it if finds that the probable result of the employer's action will be to display to the
employees that they can obtain benefits without union representation. Bartlett-Collins Co.,
230 N.L.R.B. 144, 167, 96 L.R.R.M. 1581 (1977).
' Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965); see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56-57 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971)
(discharge of non-striking employees that refused to cross picket line to prevent large scale
defection not adequate justification); Robertshaw Controls Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 377, 380,
383 (4th Cir. 1967) (decision to remove portion of operation to new plant based solely on
economic factors and thus adequate justification). Business justifications are also important
in considering claims of employer discrimination against union membership under § 8(a)(3),
but the analysis differs from that employed in a § 8(a)(1) claim. Unlike § 8(a)(1), § 8(a)(3) re-
quires that the employer have an actual motive to discriminate against union membership.
380 U.S. at 311; NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963). The Supreme
Court has recognized that the employer's "anti-union animus" may be implied. See NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967). Anti-union animus need not be proved
where the employer's conduct is inherently destructive of the employee's right to strike or
engage in collective bargaining, or where the employer's conduct has only a slight effect on
employee rights but serves no substantial and legitimate business ends. Id. The burden is
on the employer to show that his conduct was economically justified and bad only a slight ef-
fect on employee rights in order to require the Board to prove "anti-union animus" before it
may find a § 8(a)(3) violation. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378
(1967) (employer failed to prove it could not reinstate strikers because of need to adapt to
changes in business conditions); 388 U.S. at 34 (employer failed to prove legitimate motive
for granting vacation pay only to non-strikers); Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d
1331, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1976) (employer proved that protection of its credibility was
legitimate business motive for implementing proposal to make retroactive payments to
those on payroll as of certain date).
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In addition to the possible section 8(a)(1) violation, the employer may
violate his duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) if he fails to notify the
union before granting the bonus.'
The duty to bargain also imposes upon the employer an obligation to
provide relevant information to a union in response to the union's re-
quest."0 The employer's compliance with the union's requests for infor-
mation is necessary for the union to discharge its duty of representing
its members. 1 Courts have formulated a "relevance" standard to deter-
mine what information the employer must furnish to the union. 2 If the
Board finds that the union has requested information relevant to the
union's duties, the employer must comply with the union's request or he
will commit a section 8(a)(5) violation. 3
Some types of information are intrinsically necessary to a union's
ability to fulfill its statutory duty as bargaining representative." If the
requested information concerns the employees who are members of the
bargaining unit, the information is presumptively relevant. The
' See, e.g., NLRB v. Rubatex Corp., 601 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1979) (employer
violated § 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain about bonus prior to its implementation); Bartlett-
Collins Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 144, 175, 96 L.R.R.M. 1581, 1581 (1977) (unilateral furnishing of free
work gloves to non-strikers indicated intention not to bargain with union and violates §
8(a)(5)). An employer violates § 8(a)(5) when it changes the wages or other terms and condi-
tions of employment without first giving the employees' bargaining representative notice
and an opportunity to bargain about the changes. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962).
An employer may make changes in wages or working conditions with which a union does
not agree only after good faith bargaining on the proposed alterations has resulted in an im-
passe. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1949); Korn Indus., Inc.
v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 117, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1967).
" NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149, 152 (1956); see Note, The Employer's Obligation to Furnish Information to a
Labor Union, 13 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 54, 56 (1958). The union is also obligated to furnish
the employer with relevant information upon the employer's request. See Local 13, Detroit
Newspaper Printing and Graphic Communications Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 270-71
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
1 San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1977);
see NLRB v. Southland Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1965). Without necessary in-
formation, the union would be unable to perform its duties properly as bargaining agent and
no bargaining could take place. See BNA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 309-10 (Morris ed.
1971); Bartosic & Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A
Study of the Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REV.
23, 40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bartosic & Hartley].
11 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); United Aircraft Corp. v.
NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1204 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 933 (1971). If the information
requested is not relevant to legitimate union needs, the company's failure to provide it is
not a violation of § 8(a)(5). Emeryville Research Center, Shell Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d
880, 883 (9th Cir. 1971).
1 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965); see Cox, The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1401, 1422-27 (1958).
" IT&T Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039
(1968); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d at 69; see notes 15-17 infra.
11 Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928
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employer bears the burden of showing that the requested information is
not relevant."6 When the union requests information concerning em-
ployees outside the bargaining unit, however, the union has the burden
of showing that the requested information is relevant to bargainable
issues."
In S& W Motor Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 the Fourth Circuit reviewed a
National Labor Relations Board (Board) ruling that an employer violated
both sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) when the employer awarded a bonus to
employees who continued to work during a strike. 9 In the same action,
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the employer's refusal to comply
with the union's request for information regarding employees who were
not members of the bargaining unit 0 constituted a failure to bargain.2'
In S&W Motor Lines, the union and the employer were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement scheduled to expire on August 19,
1976.2 The union and the employer met for contract negotiations at in-
(1969); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d at 69; Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB,
325 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964). Originally, courts held
that only information generally relating to wages of bargaining unit employees was
presumptively relevant. 347 F.2d at 69; 325 F.2d at 750. In recent decisions, the courts have
found that unions also have a presumptive right to the addresses of bargaining unit
employees. 412 F.2d at 84. The addresses are presumptively relevant due to the union's fun-
damental need to communicate with its members. Id.; see Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 11,
at 35-38.
" Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d at 84; Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v.
NLRB, 223 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1955). Where the information is presumptively relevant, see
text accompanying notes 14-15 supra, relevance should be determined under a discovery-
type standard rather than a trial-type standard. See Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing
and Graphic Communications Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (information
must be disclosed if it has any bearing on subject matter of case); Proctor & Gamble Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310, 1315 (8th Cir. 1979) (information must be disclosed unless clearly
irrelevant). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery, "relevant" is
synonymous with "germane." See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2008 (1970).
17 NLRB v. Western Elec., Inc., 559 F.2d 1131,1133 (8th Cir. 1977) (union failed to show
information regarding salaried non-unit employees transferred into bargaining unit was
relevant); San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1977)
(union failed to show information regarding employees being trained to replace union
members in event of strike was relevant); NLRB v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 410 F.2d 953,
957 (6th Cir. 1969) (union met burden of showing information regarding employees at
building to which employer transferred work done by union members at another building
was relevant); IT&T Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 1967) (union failed to show
seniority information regarding non-unit employees transferred into the bargaining unit
was relevant).
621 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 601-02.
A bargaining unit is a group of jobs which the Board has established as an election
constituency for the purpose of determining whether the job holders wish to have union
representation. See GORMAN, supra note 3, at 66.
' 621 F.2d at 602-03.
S&W Motor Lines, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 938, 940, 98 L.R.R.M. 1488 (1978). On June 10,
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tervals from early August to late September.2 3 The employer laid off a
large number of its employees, both within and outside the bargaining
unit, in August and September.24 The employer told the state Employ-
ment Security Commission that the bargaining unit employees were laid
off as the result of a "labor dispute."'  Under North Carolina law,
employees laid off because of a labor dispute cannot receive unemploy-
ment compensation.26 The union believed, however, that the employer
gave a different reason for the layoff of employees that were not
members of the bargaining unit so that those employees would be entitled
to unemployment compensation.27 To resolve the discrepancy, the union
requested on September 15th that the employer produce the name,
social security number, address, and layoff date of each non-bargaining
unit employee laid off in the previous two weeks." The union also re-
quested that the employer provide copies of the layoff letters that he
sent to bargaining unit employees for the previous six weeks.' Although
the employer complied with the union's request for the information con-
cerning the bargaining unit employees, the employer refused to provide
the information about non-bargaining unit employees
2
The contract negotiations proved unsuccessful and, on October 16,
1976, the union went on strike.2 The employer then unilaterally2 in-
stituted a $50 per trip bonus payment to non-striking truck drivers' to
compensate the drivers for working under the difficult conditions of the
picketers' harassment. 4 All of the non-striking drivers were members of
1976, the union contacted the employer indicating its desire to negotiate changes in the col-
lective bargaining agreement which was about to expire. Id. On June 16, 1976, the employer
notified the union that it wanted to terminate the collective bargaining agreement. Id
Id. The parties conducted contract negotiations on August 9, 18, and 27, and on
September 2, 24, and 30. Id. The employer stressed his poor financial condition and his in-
ability to afford the increased benefits proposed by the union. See Brief for NLRB at 4.
" 236 N.L.R.B. at 950.
25 1&
' Id- North Carolina's Employment Security statute provides that a person who is out
of work partially or totally because of a labor dispute is ineligible for unemployment com-
pensation benefits. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(5) (1975).
" 236 N.L.R.B. at 950.
28 Id
29 1I
' Id The employer did not think the union was entitled to information concerning
employees who were not members of the bargaining unit. Id.; see text accompanying note
17 supra.
21 236 N.L.R.B. at 940.
Id at 951. The employer failed to negotiate with the union before implementing the
bonus and in later negotiations maintained that the non-striking employees were not receiv-
ing a bonus. IM at 951 n.23.
621 F.2d at 601. The employer paid approximately $70,000 in bonuses from January
to August of 1977 with some drivers earning as much as $450 per month in bonuses. 236
N.L.R.B. at 951.
' 621 F.2d at 601. Unidentified persons had cut brake air lines on the employer's truck
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the bargaining unit and several were union members. 5
The union filed a charge with the Board alleging that the employer's
conduct violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.3 6 The Board
determined that the employer's payment of the bonuses violated section
8(a)(1)"7 and that the employer's failure to bargain with the union con-
cerning the payments violated section 8(a)(5).- The Board also determined
that the employer's refusal to provide the information regarding the
non-bargaining unit employees violated section 8(a)(5). 9
The Fourth Circuit enforced the Board's order in S&W Motor Lines
with several important modifications.4" The court enforced the Board's
finding of a section 8(a)(1) violation because the evidence presented
before the administrative law judge permitted a finding that the
trailers. 236 N.L.R.B. at 940. The employer also alleged that non-striking drivers were shot
at and forced off the road while driving for the company. See Brief for Petitioner at 14.
621 F.2d at 601.
Id. at 599.
, 236 N.L.R.B. at 951-52; 98 L.R.R.M. at 1488. In determining that the bonus payments
violated § 8(a)(1), the National Labor Relations Board (Board) relied on NLRB v. Aero-Motive
Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 790, 79 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1972), enforced, 475 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1973). 236
N.L.R.B. at 951. The Board found that the bonus payments would be illegal even if they were
given solely to provide additional compensation to employees who risked personal
harm. Id., 98 L.R.R.M. at 1488. The Board considered the crucial issue to be whether the ob-
jective impact of the payment was to alert employees to the fact that nonstrikers did, and
presumably would in the future, receive special benefits which strikers will not receive. Id.;
see 195 N.L.R.B. at 792, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1498-99.
' 236 N.L.R.B. at 952, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1488. The Board found that the employer must
bargain with the union even if the union could not be expected to agree to the bonus
payments. Id. The Board noted that if the employer had conferred with the union prior to
its decision to implement the payments, the union might have been able to persuade the
employer to not issue the illegal payments. Id
In its brief before the Fourth Circuit, the Board also indicated that the company's will-
ingness to pay the bonus was evidence that the employer could afford to pay some increases
in employee benefits. Brief for NLRB at 32; see notes 23 and 33 supra. The Board speculated
that if this concession had been conveyed directly to the union through negotiatons, it might
have initiated movement at the bargaining table which could have shortened the strike.
Brief for NLRB at 32-33.
' 236 N.L.R.B. at 950-51. The Board held that the information regarding employees
who were not members of the bargaining unit was relevant because it was essential to the
union's representation of the bargaining unit employees in their unemployment compensa-
tion claims. Id.; see text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. The Board noted that the
employer failed to submit any evidence to show that the union intended to use the informa-
tion to the detriment of non-unit employees. 236 N.L.R.B. at 951.
40 621 F.2d at 603. The enforced portions of the Board's order included a directive to
the employer to cease and desist from offering rewards for physical acts against strikers,
from offering bonuses to drivers, and from encouraging employees to form their own unions.
Id. at 599-600. In addition, the employer was instructed to reinstate the strikers. Id. at 600.
The company was required to pay to each reinstated truck driver the same per trip bonus
paid to non-striking drivers until the total bonus paid the individual equalled the average
amount earned by the non-striking drivers during the strike or until such bonuses were
negotiated to agreement with the union. Id. at 600-01.
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employer interfered with the employees' collective bargaining rights."
Accordingly, the court upheld the Board's imposition of a large fine on
the employer, requiring the employer to pay the striking truck drivers
the same per trip bonuses paid the non-striking drivers.42 The Fourth
Circuit disagreed, however, with the Board's determination of a section
8(a)(5) violation and held that the employer did not fail to bargain with
the union.43 Since a strike was in progress, the court reasoned that any
attempt by the employer to negotiate with the union regarding the
special payments to non-striking workers would have been futile."
The Fourth Circuit also considered the extent of the employer's duty
to provide information to the union. The court did not enforce the
Board's finding of a section 8(a)(5) violation.' Since the union failed to
show a need for the requested information, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the employer did not violate section 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide in-
formation concerning non-bargaining unit employees. Where the collec-
tive bargaining agreement had expired and negotiations for a new agree-
ment were not proceeding well, the court found it necessary to consider
the possibility that the union had improper motives in requesting the in-
formation. The court noted that the alleged purposes for which the
union requested the information did not require the names, addresses,
and social security numbers of individual employees.48
In considering whether the unilateral grant of the $50 bonus pay-
ment violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5), the Fourth Circuit relied on its
recent opinion in NLRB v. Rubatex Corp.49 In Rubatex, an employer was
, 621 F.2d at 601; see text accompanying notes 59-63 infra.
42 621 F.2d at 600-01; see note 40 supra.
4 621 F.2d at 602; see text accompanying notes 64-69 and 74-79 infra.
" 621 F.2d at 602. The Fourth Circuit noted several factors associated with the strike
which made any attempts at bargaining futile. The employer was struggling to keep operating
in the face of (1) customer uneasiness over the uncertainty of service and (2) the sabotage of
equipment and other harassment reasonably attributed by the employer to the strikers. Id
The union had refused to relinquish its right to strike during meaningful contract negotia-
tions which caused a decline in employer's business. See Brief for Petitioner at 11.
"s 621 F.2d at 602-03. Other courts have given great weight to the Board's determina-
tion of whether requested information must be supplied to the union in a particular case.
See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1956); San Diego Newspaper Guild Local
95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 1977).
" 621 F.2d at 603.
Id. The employer in S& W Motor Lines had experienced sabotage of equipment and
other harassment. Id. at 602; see note 34 supra.
" 621 F.2d at 603. The union was concerned with the disparity created when the
employer attempted to deny laid-off bargaining unit members unemployment compensation
and, at the same time, provide laid-off employees who were not members of the bargaining
unit the same benefits. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the names, addresses, and social
security numbers of the non-bargaining unit members were not necessary to 4stablish any
disparity of treatment. Id.
11 601 F.2d 147 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979). In Rubatex, the Fourth Cir-
cuit relied on NLRB v. Aero-Motive Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 790; 79 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1972), en-
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able to continue operations throughout a strike with the aid of thirteen
union members who chose to work.5 0 The strike eventually ended and a
new agreement was executed.51 A month after the termination of the
strike, the company unilaterally paid a bonus to all employees who worked
during the strike, including the thirteen union members.52 The employer
did not make payments to the union employees who participated in the
strike.'
The Fourth Circuit held in Rubatex that the employer's action
violated both sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5).' Because the bonus clearly
demonstrated that special rewards will go to employees who choose to
refrain from protected strike activity, the court found that the payments
inhibited the free exercise of the employees' right to strike contrary to
section 8(a)(1).55 The court also found that the employer's failure to
bargain with the union prior to granting the bonus violated section
8(a)(5).5' The court noted that the employer had a duty to bargain about
the post-strike payments, even though the bargaining efforts would have
been futile.57 The court reasoned that the employer's notice to the union
would have brought the illegal payments to the union's attention and
perhaps have motivated the employer to seek alternatives in an effort to
avoid litigation.
58
In deciding the section 8(a)(1) claim, the Fourth Circuit in S&W
Motor Lines noted that payments made during the strike were not per
se illegal,59 while payments made after a strike, as in Rubatex, were per
forced, 475 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1973). 601 F.2d at 150. In Aero-Motive, the Board determined
that awarding a bonus to non-strikers after a new collective bargaining agreement had been
signed was an unfair labor practice. 195 N.L.R.B. at 792.
601 F.2d at 149.
Id.
= Id. Of the thirteen Rubatex employees receiving bonuses, nine who worked during
the entire strike received $100 each, and four who worked proportionately less time received
$25 each. Id
$ Id.
I Id. at 149-51. The Fourth Circuit found that the Board's remedy, which required pay-
ment of an equivalent bonus to the striking employees, was not an abuse of the Board's
discretion. Id at 151. The employer was required to pay $100 to each striker and $75 to
those non-strikers who received only $25. Id.
= Id. at 150.
Id. at 150-51.
5' Id. at 150. The employer in Rubatex was sure that the union would not agree to the
payments, since the payments had the effect of inhibiting.the future right of the employees
to strike. Id.
I Id. The Fourth Circuit in Rubatex relied heavily on Aero-Motive for the proposition
that union notification of the bonus payments would have encouraged non-litigatious alter-
natives. Id. In Aero-Motive, the Board recognized that voluntary settlements are a vital
part of collective bargaining that should be encouraged. 195 N.L.R.B. at 793. The duty to
bargain enables bargaining agents to detect illegalities in apparently legal actions. Id. at
792.
5, 621 F.2d at 602. Inducements made during a strike may have the effect of destroying
the union's power to strike and therefore violate § 8(a)(1). See, e.g., NLRB v. Beverage-Air
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se illegal." Although the court acknowledged that the Board's finding of
a section 8(a)(1) violation was fairly debatable, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the scope of review for a section 8(a)(1) violation is
limited.6 The Board is primarily responsible for weighing any business
justification for the employer's conduct against the alleged invasion of
employee rights.2 The court enforced the Board's finding because the
finding was supported by substantial evidence. 3
In refusing to uphold the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(5) violation,
the court distinguished S&W Motor Lines from Rubatex." Unlike
Rubatex, the bonus payments in S&W Motor Lines were given during
the strike. 5 Since the strike was still in progress at the time the
payments were given, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the employer
should not be forced to bargain where negotiation is not conceivable."
Co., 402 F.2d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 1968) (prohibiting employer from supplying free cigarettes
and lunches to non-striking employees); Bartlett-Collins Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 144, 166-67, 96
L.R.R.M. 1581, 1581 (1977) (prohibiting employer from distributing free work gloves to non-
striking employees); Chanticleer, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 241, 252, 63 L.R.R.M. 1237, 1239 (1966)
(prohibiting employer's wage increases to non-striking employees and striker
replacements). See generally Schwartz & Bernstein, Discipline and Discharge of
Employees for Engaging in Unlawful Work Stoppages in STRIKES, STOPPAGES AND
BOYCOTTS 285 (1977). Inducements made during a strike, however, may not violate § 8(a)(1)
where the employer's business justifications outweigh any invasion of employee rights. See
Omaha Typographical Union No. 190 v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (8th Cir. 1976); Sign
and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 286, 298, 92 L.R.R.M. 1246, 1248-49 (1976). In Omaha
Typographical, bonus payments given only to employees who were not members of the
bargaining unit did not violate § 8(a)(1), since the payments neither prevented members of
the bargaining unit from going on strike nor coerced their early return. 545 F.2d at 1143-44.
In Sign and Pictorial and Pilot Freight, emergency or safety justifications were found to
outweigh any invasion of the employees' right to strike. See 419 F.2d at 736 (payment of $25
bonus to non-strikers for action in wake of hurricane threatening company's business was
justified); 223 N.L.R.B. at 298, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1248-49 (permitting non-striking owner-
operator truckdrivers to use employer's equipment and work in pairs to protect themselves
and their equipment was justified).
' 621 F.2d at 602. Bonus payments announced and given after a strike are per se viola-
tions of § 8(a)(1), since the only effect of the payments is to inhibit the future right of
employees to strike. See NLRB v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 619 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir.
1980) (one-day vacation granted to non-strikers following resolution of strike); NLRB v.
Rubatex, 601 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1979) (bonus payments granted to non-strikers following
resolution of strike); Aero-Motive Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 790, 792, 79 L.R.R.M. 1496, 1498-99
(1972), enforced, 475 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1973) (same). Since the payments are not given until
after the strike, they cannot be justified on the basis of economic necessity or emergency.
601 F.2d at 150.
" 621 F.2d at 601.
62 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236-37 (1963); see cases cited in NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., Inc., 569
F.2d 162, 166 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978).
621 F.2d at 601; see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951).
621 F.2d at 602.
SId.
Id. The Fourth Circuit stated that if the strike was over, the employer's notification
could have positive effects. Id.; see note 58 supra.
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The Fourth Circuit also noted that since the payments were made dur-
ing the strike, they were not per se violative of section 8(a)(1) and may
have been justified by the employer's economic or emergency concerns."
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the employer should not be required to
foresee how the Board would ultimately resolve a debatable section
8(a)(1) charge. 8 The court concluded that when bonus payments are made
during a strike and the potential section 8(a)(1) charge is fairly debatable,
the employer should be relieved of any duty to bargain about the
bonus. 9
While the Fourth Circuit denied the union's section 8(a)(5) charge in
S&W Motor Lines, the court upheld the Board's remedy for the section
8(a)(1) violation."0 Thus, as in Rubatex, the court required the employer in
S&W Motor Lines to pay bonuses to the striking employees equivalent
to those given to the non-striking employees. 1' The penalty promises to
be substantial, since the employer has admitted to paying $70,000 in
bonuses to non-striking employees in one eight-month period. 2 Given the
deterrent effect of this penalty on employer bonuses to non-striking
employees, the failure of the court to require the employer to bargain is
insignificant. 3
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit recognized that, in limited situa-
tions, the union's need to bargain on behalf of the employees may be
outweighed by the employer's right to keep his business operating74 and
by the debilitating effect mandatory bargaining would have on that
right.75 Courts have previously determined that unilateral action during
67 621 F.2d at 602; see notes 59 and 60 supra.
621 F.2d at 602.
1 Id.
70 Id.
7' Id. at 601. In Rubatex, the employer granted the bonuses to non-striking employees
on a per-employee basis. 601 F.2d at 149. The court instructed the employer to make up the
difference by paying each employee the flat sum, or the difference between the flat sum and
what he had been given. Id. at 151; see note 54 supra. In S&W Motor Lines, the employer
granted bonuses on a per trip basis. 621 F.2d at 601. The court awarded bonuses to be deter-
mined individually, contingent on the number of trips the striking employee makes follow-
ing the decision. Id.; see note 40 and text accompanying note 41 supra.
236 N.L.R.B. at 951; see note 33 supra.
7 See, e.g., NLRB v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 619 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir. 1980) (court
elected not to determine validity of § 8(a)(5) claim after finding § 8(a)(1) violation).
", See Inter-collegiate Press v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 846 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 938 (1974) (use of economic coercion permissible if employer has established
substantial business justification); NLRB v. Southern Coach & Body Co., 336 F.2d 214,
218-19 (5th Cir. 1964) (unilateral reclassification of employees during strike is proper if
necessary to continue operation); Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1963)
(unilateral decision to subcontract delivery services during strike is proper if necessary to
keep plant operating).
71 Requiring bargaining can effectively deprive an employer of his ability to cope with
a strike situation. Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d at 400. While the employees' right to
strike should not be interfered with, the employer should not be forced to lose his business
during extensive negotiation sessions with the union. Id. Courts have expressly recognized
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a strike in response to certain situations, such as physical emergencies"
and the fulfillment of basic human needs," did not violate section 8(a)(5). 8
The Fourth Circuit in S&W Motor Lines found that the futility of
bargaining over arguably legal bonus payments made during a strike
also justifies the employer's failure to contact the union prior to award-
ing the payments.79
The Fourth Circuit's decision should not, however, be read to in-
dicate judicial disapproval of the importance of the employer's duty to
bargain. The employer's duty to bargain is premised on the effect the
employer's failure to bargain would have on employee confidence in the
union' ° and the potential mutual benefits obtained from avoiding in-
dustrial strife by bargaining.8 When a strike is in progress, the futility
of bargaining over arguably legal payments which are necessary to the
employer's business justifies the employer's failure to bargain.2 Post-
strike payments or payments made during a strike with only specious
justification are patently illegal, however, and the potential for correc-
tion through bargaining tips the scales toward a section 8(a)(5) violation
if the employer makes the payments without first notifying the union. 3
In determining that the employer was not required to comply with
the union request for information regarding the non-bargaining unit
employees, the Fourth Circuit required the union to make an affirmative
the employer's right to bypass bargaining for economic reasons in certain situations. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (employer has no duty to
bargain during strike about hiring striker replacements); M.R. & R. Trucking Co. v. NLRB,
434 F.2d 689, 696 (5th Cir. 1970) (common carrier has no duty to bargain during strike about
hiring striker replacements).
76 See Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(unilateral payment of $25 bonus to non-strikers for action in wake of hurricane threatening
company's business was justified).
" See United Steelworkers Local 5571 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1968) (unilateral provision for free food and beverages justified, since
regular food service would not cross picket lines).
78 The Supreme Court noted that the Board should accept certain circumstances as ex-
cusing or justifying unilateral action. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747-48 (1962).
' 621 F.2d at 602.
" Unilateral action can have a psychological as well as an economic effect by under-
mining employee's confidence in the union's authority. See Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB,
391 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Mrs. Fay's Pies, 341 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1965).
61 See note 58 supra.
621 F.2d at 602.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in S& W Motor Lines should not be overextended into
a rule stating that an employer can always give bonus payments during a strike without
consulting the union. In S&W Motor Lines, the employer was faced with economic dif-
ficulties and harassment from strikers. 621 F.2d at 602; see note 44 supra. These employer
problems operated as both potential justifications in defense of the § 8(a)(1) claim and as
reasons why bargaining would almost certainly be futile. 621 F.2d at 602; see text accompa-
nying notes 66-69 supra. In situations involving a clear § 8(a)(1) violation, or strong reasons
why bargaining might be successful, the Fourth Circuit may find a duty to bargain.
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
showing of a "need to know."84 The majority's "need to know" require-
ment is consistent with the holdings of other courts that require the
union to make an affirmative showing of relevance.'- The relevance re-
quirement may be satisfied by an initial, but not overwhelming, demon-
stration." The Fourth Circuit's "need to know" requirement suggests
that the information is relevant only if the union proves it needs to know
the information to discharge its duty as employee representative. 7 The
majority's view is well-reasoned because only when "relevant" is read to
mean "necessary" can the union's request for information be consistent
with the underlying rationale of the employer's duty to furnish informa-
tion.8 The dissent's approach would allow a court to find the relevancy
requirement satisfied by a showing of factual circumstances that
demonstrate the reasons why the union might have needed the informa-
tion,89 thereby giving unions virtually unlimited access to employer
data.
The Fourth Circuit indicated that the protection of employees who
are not members of the bargaining unit is one justification for requiring
the union to prove a "need to know", since the necessity of the informa-
tion to the union's duty of representation may not be readily apparent to
the employer.8 Other courts have gone a step further and found that
even if the union proves that the requested information is relevant, cir-
cumstances might justify an employer's refusal to furnish the informa-
621 F.2d at 603.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 615 F.2d 1100, 1101 (5th Cir. 1980)
(relevance shown); NLRB v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 388 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1968)
(per curiam) (same); Greensboro News Co., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 102 L.R.R.M. 1164 (1979)
(same). See also San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 868-69 (9th
Cir. 1977) (relevance not shown); IT&T Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 1967)
(same); General Motors Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 101 L.R.R.M. 1461 (1979) (same).
San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d at 868-69. See also Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1969) (requiring special showing of pertinence).
The "need to know" requirement is not overly burdensome for the union. 548 F.2d at 868-69.
621 F.2d at 603; see Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 11, at 40-41.
See Note, A Union's Right to Company Information for Use in Collective Bargain-
ing-The Ninth Circuit Approach, 4 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 362, 372 n.73 (1973) (where infor-
mation is not presumptively relevant, union's need for information is evidence of relevance);
Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 11, at 40-41.
621 F.2d at 606 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall argued that the relevancy of the re-
quested information in S&W Motor Lines was satisfied by factual circumstances, such as
the contemporaneous Commission hearing, the numerous claims of unfair labor practices,
and the heading of the union letter requesting the employee data. Id at 605-06. Judge Hall
asserted that while these factual circumstances do not technically meet the relevancy stan-
dard, they do prove the validity of the request and satisfy the protection purpose of the
relevancy requirement. Id- at 606.
90 See San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1977)
(explaining consequences if court finds union entitled to information upon showing of mere
concoction of general theory of information's usefulness to union).
11 621 F.2d at 603.
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tion.92 If an employer can show a clear and present danger 3 to the non-
bargaining unit employees because of striking employees' harassments
and threats, he can legitimately refuse to release the information. 4
While such a defense was neither necessary"s nor available 6 to the
employer in S&WMotorLines, non-bargaining unit employees may avail
themselves of the protection in a case where the union actually proves a
"need to know."
In S&W Motor Lines, the Fourth Circuit analyzed two different
elements of the employer's duty to bargain collectively in good faith. In
considering both the employer's duty to inform the union of bonus
payments to non-strikers and his duty to furnish employee information,
the Fourth Circuit articulated the circumstances in which the union has
the burden to prove that the employer should be required to bargain. In
the bonus context, the court required that the employer notify the union
of the payments only where the union could offer valuable input regard-
ing patently illegal payments. The court also held that information
regarding non-unit members should be provided to a union only when
the union proved a "need to know." 9 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision
in S&W Motor Lines represents a careful, narrow approach to the
employer's duty to bargain.
DANA S. CONNELL
92 Relevant information need not always be disclosed. See GORMAN, supra note 3, at
416. If the employer can demonstrate that the reason behind the union's request for finan-
cial data is to harass or publicly embarrass the company, the employer will not be required
to disclose the information. NLRB v. Robert S. Abbott Pub. Co., 331 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir.
1964). The employer may also defend against the disclosure of relevant information by
demonstrating its sensitive nature or the danger that the union will use the information to
harass employees. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318 (1979) (employer not
required to furnish union with employee aptitude test scores due to sensitive nature of
testing information); text accompanying notes 93-94 infra.
, United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1207 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401
U.S. 933 (1971).
' See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 1972) (employer not re-
quired to furnish names and addresses where danger of harassment and of violence against
non-union employees); Sign and Pictorial Union Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 738 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (refusal to permit union to examine records justified by harassment, threats, and
assaults visited upon strike replacements); Decaturville Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d
886, 889-90 (6th Cir. 1969) (employer not required to furnish names and addresses in view of
employee's right to privacy and freedom from harassment at home). See Irving & DeDeo,
The Right to Privacy and Freedom of Information: The NLRB and Issues Under the
Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, 29 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 49, 77 (1976).
11 Since relevance was not shown in S&W Motor Lines, the court did not need to con-
sider circumstances which might have justified a refusal to furnish the information. See text
accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
" See S&W Motor Lines, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 938, 951 (1978) (respondent submitted no
evidence that union intended to use information to detriment of non-bargaining unit
employees).
" See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
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